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of "direct" planning of production, price, and wages. After the many
scholarly studies showing the complexities of the problem of organization of regulatory agencies, Rosenfarb can, after only two pages of
discussion, reach an easy conclusion that quasi-judicial functions should
be independent and that "matters relating to economic planning and
administration" should be integrated. 0 The problem of democratic
controls of administration is likewise given only a few pages."- The
author recognizes the necessity in a planned society for a greater
measure of "integration of representative government" than exists in
this country, but he discusses it as primarily a problem of the separation of powers without giving attention to the decentralization of the
American party system. The whole framework of the book is based
upon the assumption of a single human urge, the power drive. Most
political scientists, at least, will agree with Rosenfarb that this is a more
realistic approach than that of Marxian economics, but these and others
may still raise the question as to whether an adequate s6cial theory
can be founded on any assumption. of the singleness of motives.
In spite of its weaknesses, many will find this an interesting and
stimulating book. If it is overassertive and chooses alternatives too
easily at times, it is nevertheless filled with penetrating observations
and stimulating statements. Parts of the book, such as that on "Power
Distribution and Political Systems," strike a high level. The book
challenges attention because of its forceful presentation of the thesis
that man must plan, and because of the confident argument that freedom
and democracy are not incompatible with planning. Its deficiencies,
nevertheless, indicate a need for a more careful analysis of the types
(and also the limits) of planning, the methods of administrative implementation, and the probable effects of economic planning on man
and his politics.
Emmette S.
Redford.*
Free Speech. By Alexander Meiklejohn. Harper and Brothers, 1948.
Pp. xiv, 107. $2.00.
Dr. Meiklejohn, in a book which greatly needed writing, has thought
through anew the foundations and structure of our theory of free
speech. In a season of freedom's greatest tension, when first principles
are everywhere in the crush of compromise, he rejects all compromise.
He re-examines the fundamental principles of Justice Holmes' theory
of free speech and finds it wanting because, as he views it, under the
Holmes doctrine speech is not free enough.
In these few pages, Holmes meets an adversary worthy of him. It
was a comparatively simple matter for Holmes to defeat the Supreme
Court majority which at first rejected his views. Justices such as
Sanford and Butler and McReynolds had nothing but the brute force
'opP. 226-8.
"Pp. 224-6.

*Professor of Government, The University of Texas.
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of a slim majority to support their will in the years 1919 to 1930, and
brute force could not long triumph over the pen, the philosophy, and
the spirit of so great an adversary as Holmes.
But war between Holmes and Meiklejohn is a far different matter.
Meiklejohn in his own way writes a prose as piercing as Holmes, and
as a foremost American philosopher, the reach of his culture is as
great. This battle, thus, as near as may be between giants in different
areas, is between equals; and when Meiklejohn leaps to attack "a
set of ideas, a theory of morality, which ran deep through all [Holmes']
reflections and seeped down to his interpretations of the Constitution,"
we may believe that this is the most dangerous assault which the
Holmes position has ever borne.

I
Meiklejohn's philosophy has a distant but familiar ring, for it is a
philosophy we have not heard in a long time. It is the philosophy of
the Declaration of Independence. I use the word "philosophy" here
not in the loose sense in which we may invoke the historic documents
on the Fourth of July, but in its technical sense of underlying theory.
Meiklejohn accepts the "compact" theory of government, and his thinking about free speech begins there.
Thus, says Meiklejohn, in American theory at least, we are governed
not by alien rulers, but by ourselves, and we are governed by ourselves only because we have consented so to be governed. But we
have conditioned our consent upon the right to participate, to the
extent of one free vote and one free voice for each of us. It is our
prerogative to make and to insist upon such compacts, because, as an
inherent aspect of human dignity we have the "inalienable" right
to govern ourselves. We cannot, in the full meaning of the term,
govern ourselves without an absolute and unlimited right of free
speech in all matters concerning the policies, present or proposed, of
government. So, says Meiklejohn, freedom of speech may never be
abridged when it is of government that we speak.
In this approach it is the right of self-government which is inalienable, not the right of expression itself, and Meiklejohn believes
that the First Amendment is applicable only to that speech which
relates to government. Libel, or obscenity, or speech as an auxiliary to
conspiracy to commit crime for gain-these, says Meiklejohn, have
nothing to do with self-government. Hence as to them the First Amendment is totally irrelevant. He thus divides speech into two categories,
"public" and "private."
Our public speech, says Meiklejohn, is protected by the First Amendment absolutely, and here he repeats again and again the simple
language of the First Amendment itself: "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech." There is no qualification here,
says Meiklejohn, for any danger, clear or obscure, present or remote.
Our private speech, on the other hand, is part of that liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
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Fourteenth, and is hence subject to those "reasonable" modifications
which we are accustomed to associate with Due Process. The Privileges
and Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, he believes,
was intended to make the First Amendment in his absolute sense
applicable to the states; he thinks it significant that just as freedom
of speech is not to be "abridged" in the First Amendment, so the
privileges and immunities should not be "abridged" under the Fourteenth.
The argument marches in rhetoric strangely unfamiliar to lawyers,
but exhibits sufficient mastery of our trade to command respect. Where
a lawyer's argument would begin with Jefferson and Madison or
perhaps with Milton or Mill, a philosopher's analysis can start with
Plato; and from the paradox of the Apology and the Crito Meiklejohn
draws this doctrine: "If the government attempts to limit the freedom
of a man's opinion, that man and his fellows with him, has both the
right and duty of disobedience. But if, on the other hand, by regular
legal procedure, his life or his property are required of him, he must
submit."' From this comes the major premise of the volume: It is
the "mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which
the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. ' 2 The First
Amendment forbids us to be afraid of any idea.
From this standpoint, the clear and present danger test for limitation
of speech as originated by Holmes is "disaster." It is a disaster because
the very possibility of a limitation on a freedom which should be
absolute, the freedom of "public speech," permits the degradation of
what should be a fixed freedom by something as unfixed as judicial
predilection.
II
The Holmes philosophy of free speech moves from wholly different
foundations. When Holmes expresses himself with great care and
precision on freedom of speech, he has nothing to say about "inalienable
rights," or "the dignity of man," or the underlying moral values of
freedom. He instead bespeaks a philosophy of utility, and was, in the
area of free speech at least, in that philosophical movement we call
pragmatism. It is no accident that John Dewey, our foremost formal
philosopher of pragmatism, is able to underwrite Holmes' philosophy
of free speech with complete agreement.3
'Pp.
21, 22.
2

pp. 25,26.

BDEwrr,

PROBLEMS OF MEN 118-121 (1859). Dewey's statement of the Holmes
philosophy which he embraces on freedom of speech is the sharpest possible denial
of Meiklejohn's own thesis. Dewey says: "Holmes and Brandeis are notable not
only for their study defense of civil liberties but even more for the fact that they
based their defense on the indispensable value of free inquiry and free discussion
to the normal development of public welfare, not upon anything inherent in the

individual as such." Id. at 120.
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The classic Holmes' expression of his view is in these lines from his
dissent in Abrams v. United States:
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want
a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes
in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out."
The best that Meiklejohn can say for this is that Holmes reached
the right result, but by the wrong method. Holmes says here that we
should not persecute those with whom we disagree because we may
be wrong about it; because the persecuted may be right; because the
only way to find out is to leave ideas to the sifting process of the intellectual market place. In short, Holmes would let speech be free by a
process of balancing, because it is socially useful to do so.
But in the balance of utility Holmes, at least at the beginning of his
thinking, admitted that sometimes, in particular crises, the balance
might be cast the other way. In his first opinion on the subject, Holmes
said that words could be suppressed when there was "a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." 5 And in the case of Debs, Holmes permitted
imprisonment for simple expression of an opinion about government
policies because the opinion was radically against the current of popular
belief.6
4250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
5Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
6
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Debs was charged with the attempt
to incite insubordination or mutiny in the armed forces and to obstruct recruiting
by giving a speech. The speech extolled both socialism and pacifism during the
First World War. Justice Holmes for a unanimous Court upheld a jury finding
that the speech did in fact attempt to obstruct recruiting.
Professor Chafee, the country's foremost writer on freedom of speech and the
principal upholder of the Holmes view generally, says: "Debs' utterances are
hard to reconcile with the Supreme Court test of 'clear and present danger,' but
Justice Holmes was willing to accept the jury's verdict .... It is regrettable that
he felt unable to go behind the verdict." CHuAFu, Fkm SPEcH3 zr T
UNrTrm
STATES 84 (1941). Holmes expressed the view to Pollock that his decision was
unquestionably sound, but added: "Now I hope the President will pardon him
and some other poor devils with whom I have more sympathy. Those whose cases
have come before us have seemed to me poor fools whom I would have passed
over if I could." 2 HOL Ms-POLCz
Luras 11 (1941).
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The Debs case points up the difference in both philosophy and result
in the Holmes-Meiklejohn thinking. In the Meiklejohn view, Debs
had an inalienable right to say his say; and in the Holmes view, he
could be sent to prison. And yet I think that the Meiklejohn criticism
of Holmes is, in part at least, a product of misunderstanding, and that
the differences between them, so far as end results alone are concerned,
evaporate almost completely.
What Meiklejolm is really criticizing is free speech-wise, an early
Holmes who himself changed in the direction Meiklejohn would go,
and after the Abrams case, both Holmes' results and much of his theory
are completely acceptable to Meiklejohn. The clear and present danger
theory grew and was moulded into perfected form as the years went
by, sometimes by Holmes and sometimes by Brandeis. In the Whitney
concurrence, Brandeis, with Holmes concurring, put the proper rule
thus:
"To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free
and fearless reasonig applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for free discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more
'' 7
speech, not enforced silence.
This statement is accepted by Meiklejohn as a valid principle of
freedom. 8 If Meiklejohn accepts the Brandeis statement, and if Holmes
also accepted it, then there cannot be as much difference as Meiklejohn
thinks between Holmes and himself. One may see a wide difference
of verbalization between the two without being able to preceive just
where, from Abrams on, they would split on a concrete case.
The final substance of the clear and present danger theory as applied
to government policy seems to be this: Anyone may, with full freedom,
advocate any idea he wishes directed to the peaceful processes of government. This includes the right to advocate an end to the state and the
substitution of a new one, which may not have an equivalent to the
First Amendment. The direct incitement to violence however, will
not be allowed when it is clear that there is in fact such a direct incitement and also it is highly likely that such violence will occur, thus
frustrating the right of the people to choose their own course of action
peaceably. I think both Holmes and Meiklejohn subscribe to this
principleY
If this is so, then the Meiklejohn analysis of the Holmes dissent in the
Abrams case is unpersuasive. For example, Holmes began by saying
7

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
MmHL._ToHrq, p. 53.

8

9
Meiklejobn does not deal extensively with the problem of incitement to violence, but various phrases throughout his book support the interpretation given

above. See, for example, pp. 22-24.
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that persecution for difference of opinion seemed to him "perfectly
logical," and that abstinence from persecution was an indication that
the stronger party thought the speech of the lesser party ineffectual.
Meiklejohn interprets the passage as meaning that "Suppression of the
hostile opinions of others is justified."' 1 This is a remote interpretation
of Holmes. True, Holmes said persecution was "logical," but no man
in our legal history would have been quicker to deny that merely
because something was "logical" it was "justified." The Abrams dissent
is another example of Holmes' most famous proposition: "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience.""' Because suppression is merely logical, says Holmes, it must give way to the great lesson
of experience, that one is never so right that he cannot possibly be
wrong. Because "time has upset many fighting faiths," we must listen
rather than suppress.
When Holmes words himself thus, and when he thinks thus, he and
Meiklejohn part company on basic philosophical concepts. But in the
area of free speech, men of good will may come to the same result by
different roads; and there is nothing in this critique of it which shatters
the Abrams dissent as the rock of the citadel on which freedom of
speech may stand.
m
But though Holmes be unvanquished, so is Meiklejohn. His book
has startling values apart from the re-examination of Holmes. Brevity
dictates that these be listed only:
1. What is written above says only that Holmes and Meiklejohn
come to very similar ends, and from the standpoint of him who would
join them at the meeting place, the path is unimportant. But there
are those who are not at these ends, who need still to discover a way of
coming to the conclusion that speech aimed at orderly change, no matter
how drastic that change be, must be absolutely free. Those who are
pragmatists, who doubt the existence of any truths apart from their
consequences, who believe in the theory of experimentalism in the
social sciences as that theory is raised to legal philosophy by, for
example, Holmes and the late Chief Justice Stone-the group so believing can follow Holmes. But certainly not all Americans are in this
group. This theory is passionless stuff, and without Holmes' personal
verve and sparkle, might never have achieved legal currency and may
not keep it. There are Americans who accept a theory of morality
which admits of inalienable rights, which starts its thinking about free
speech from Meiklejohn's inherent "dignity of men who govern themselves." There are men who would describe themselves as Meiklejohn
would*describe himself, and as Holmes would not describe himself, as
"idealists." This book is valuable as an expression of the doctrine by
which such men may join the followers of Holmes in the acceptance
of the values of freedom of speech.
10MEnmE OHN, p. 87.
"HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 1

(38th printing 1945).
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2. The suggestion by Meillejohn of the necessity of a distinction
between "public" and "private" speech is of enormous legal significance,
and deserves the most thoughtful analysis. One need not agree with his
remedy to believe that he has diagnosed a problem. The problem is
this: The clear and present danger test was devised to deal with public,
or political, discussion, and this only thirty years ago. Beginning with
Thornhill v. Alabama,1- it has been extended into remote fields such
as speech concerning labor relations. Its proliferation throughout the
entire zone of expression, as for example in matters of religion or
obscenity, may result in a test so broad that it will become meaningless;
and the danger is that in the course of narrowing the test to fit these
marginal situations, it may be dangerously limited in its primary purpose. Meiklejohn is thus sensibly uneasy that if the protection of free
speech is made to cover too much, the inevitable contraction will go
too far.
Were one writing on a clean slate, one might accept the "public"
and "private" dichotomy. But traditions of even so little as thirty years
have not only value, but force; and the distinction that Meiklejohn
makes is too elusive to compel us to scuttle our experience with clear
and present danger, though that experience is short. Suppose a man
says "the entire Board of Directors of the United States Steel Corporation is incompetent, and should be removed." Is his freedom to be
measured by a different standard than that of him who says "the
entire Board of County Commissioners is incompetent and should be
removed?" As four Justices of the Supreme Court said last year, the
power of United States Steel is "a government in itself," possessed of
"power so great that only a government of the people should have it."1s
And is Harriet Beecher Stowe's "Uncle Tom's Cabin" a "political"
work, to be governed by "public" standards, or is it to be subject to
"private" norms?
We may agree with Meiklejohn that some speech is closer to the
primary object of the First Amendment, the freedom of men to control
their common affairs, than other speech, and still prefer to keep our
traditions and work within the framework of clear and present danger,
free speech, and Due Process. Within that framework much of the
object Meiklejohn suggests can, and should, be attained. The clear
and present danger test, with its opaque reference to "the substantive
evils it has a right to prevent," goes very little distance until we know
what evils Congress does have a right to prevent. The task of defining
those evils is largely undone, and the Holmes test in Gitlow,14 the
Brandeis test in Whitney, and the Meiklejohn test here ought to be
succinctly stated as applicable to all forms of expression aimed at the
policies of government: if the statement is not direct advocacy of prompt
force and violence, it never presents a "substantive evil" with which
(1940).
"3United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 68 S.Ct. 1107, 1127, 1128, 1129 (1948).
4
12310 U.S. 88

1 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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Congress may deal. The "evil" in such a field as labor relations or
obscenity ought to be sharply and separately stated.
3. The book is a call to arms in a dangerous time. Meiklejohn
denounces as hostile to freedom of opinion the new practices of guilt
by association, loyalty orders, restrictions on opinions which aliens may
utter, and the antics of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
On such issues any American not satisfied to be an ostrich must either
revert to his first principles of freedom or re-examine them. Meiklejohn
stimulates that process with new thoughts about some old ideas.
John P. Frank.*
Wills., Gifts, and Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948. By
Seymour S. Mintz, Richard C. Flesch and Bernard Soman.
Washington: Bureau of National Affairs Inc. 1948. Pp. 179.
As a law review editor I often puzzled over and sometimes deplored
the custom of book reviewers to state dutifully a book title heading
and then utilize it only as a vehicle for conveying their own ideas on
a subject sometimes only casually related. With some embarrassment
I now find myself succumbing to the urge to do likewise, although
hoping that the book title and some of the ideas are more than incidentally related.
The Revenue Act of 19481 has sired an awesome deluge of literature
flowing in the direction of the practising lawyer in an effort to make
him conscious of the need for advance tax planning. This book directs
a particularly forceful stream in that direction. There are still too
many lawyers to whom tax problems are as remote as those of patent
or admiralty law and to whom tax practice connotes preparation of
returns and contesting deficiencies. It is almost a truism to say that
the lawyer who waits until the litigation stage to work out his client's
tax problems has already lost the cause and is merely carrying out a
delaying action.
Perhaps the original fault is traceable to the client who asks his
lawyer to draw a will or a trust agreement according to certain terms,
but the lawyer who does only that, withal competently and skillfully,
becomes an accomplice to the act. It is at this stage, at the latest, that
the true counsellor must anticipate and forestall future "30 day letters."
Again it is a truism to point out that tax considerations, however
important, are probably secondary. Few clients or taxpayers are
interested in the fascinating academic problem of getting rid of the
largest amount of property with the smallest possible tax. But certainly,
the client, however well cemented his notions, must be informed of the
tax cost of his estate program and must be offered the opportunity to
reject cheaper alternative dispositions. The author who can persuade
the general practitioner to consider tax problems early and perhaps to
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
'Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (passed April 2, 1948, over presidential

veto).

